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Abstract
 
Authorship – authority – authorisation – the author – the author’s will – the author’s 
intention: these form a cluster of notions whose validity for scholarly editing I funda-
mentally question. Taking measure from a historical survey of the discipline’s principles 
and practice from their institution under the dominance of stemmatics up to their main 
present-day ‘author orientation’ (Shillingsburg 1996), I see the need to split the terms 
‘author’ and ‘authorship’ into a pragmatic versus a conceptual aspect. What textual 
scholarship engages with, directly and tangibly, is not authors but texts (and equally not 
works but texts), materially inscribed in transmissions. In the materiality and artifice 
of texts, ‘authoriality’ is accessible conceptually only, in a manner analog-ous to the 
Foucauldian ‘author function’. Under such premises, as well, ‘authority’, ‘authorisation’ 
and ‘authorial intention’ become recognisable as exogenous to texts, not integral to them. 
Consequently, I propose to abandon ‘authority’, ‘authorisation’ and ‘authorial intention’ 
as overriding principles and arbiters in editorial scholarship. Scholarly editing instead 
should re-situate itself in relation to texts, to textual criticism, to literary criticism and to 
literary theory alike, and do so by re-focussing the method-ology of its own practice. It 
should relinquish the external props termed ‘authorised document’, ‘textual authority’, or 
‘authorial intention’ hitherto deferred to. Instead, it should revitalise skills fundamental 
to inherited editorial scholarship, namely those of critically assessing, and of editorially 
realising, textual validity. To re-embed editorial scholarship in literary criticism and 
theory, moreover, the interpretative and hermeneutic dimensions of textual criticism 
and scholarly editing will need to be freshly mapped.
 
Keywords: Author, Author Function, Authorship, Author’s Intention, Hermeneutics 
of Scholarly Editing.
1. Preliminary: Document – Text – Work
Authorship and The Author are lode-stars of literary criticism. They are speci-
fically, too, the habitual points of orientation for textual criticism and scholarly 
editing. Here, where materially the very foundations of literary studies are laid, 
we find aggregating around the notions and concepts of ‘authorship’ and ‘author’ 
further terms, such as: authority; authorisation; the author’s will; the author’s 
intention. These form a dense and particularly forceful cluster in this field be-
cause here critics and editors confront texts in their diverse instantiations in and 
on documents. Given documents, some form of authoriality is always assumed 
behind them. Indeed, we commonly construe the relationship by defining do-
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cuments as derivates, and thus as functions, of ‘authoriality’. Yet if we anchor 
the perspective in the materiality itself, the model may equally be reversed. Since 
it is from the materiality of the documents alone that the authoriality behind 
them may be discerned, we may legitimately declare ‘authoriality’ a function 
of the documents. The validity of such reversal, as well as its consequences in 
theory and practice, is what this essay attempts to explore.1
Documents constitute the ineluctably material supports for texts. Without 
the stone, clay, papyrus, parchment, or paper on which we find them inscribed, 
texts would have no material reality. Hence, in our age-old traditions of writing 
and the written, text and document live in a seemingly inseparable symbiosis, 
to the extent that we substitute one for the other in everyday speech, even in 
conception. Contracts, as well as wills, for instance, are formulated in language 
as texts. Yet it is customarily on the grounds that we possess and can show them 
as legal documents (signed, witnessed and sealed) that we declare them valid and 
binding. However, to define the material document as ‘the contract’ or ‘the will’ 
is a pragmatic shortcut, a negotiating of the everyday in a mode of speech-act 
symbolism. Logically, text and document are distinct and separable entities.2
To recognise that text and document are logically separable provides a 
basis for assessing or re-assessing the value and weight of the terms in our 
opening cluster from a point of view of textual criticism and editing. In 
practice, and in our cultural experience, admittedly, we never encounter 
texts other than inscribed on, and carried by documents. Or hardly ever: for 
a poem or a narrative recited from memory, or composed on the spur of the 
moment, may still exemplify to us the primal invention and transmission of 
a text independently of any encoding on, and into, a material support. This 
has repercussions for differentiating ‘text’ and ‘work’. To paraphrase what I 
have developed at greater length elsewhere: works in language can be instan-
tiated both materially and immaterially. As instantiated, we perceive works 
as texts. Any one given text instantiates the work. What binds the instantia-
tions together is ‘the work’. The work exists but immaterially, yet it is at the 
same time more than a mere notion. It possesses conceptual substance, for it 
constitutes the energizing centre of the entirety of its textual instantiations. 
Among the work’s many textual instantiations belong, too, texts as established 
in editions. An edited text may in fact be an instantiation optimally represent-
ing the work, even while it is never more – though commonly nothing less 
– than one considered textual representation of the work; or, a representation 
editorially pre-considered before offered as a main textual foundation for a 
critical consideration of the work by interpreters and readers (Gabler 2010b).
2. Author – Authorship – Authority and the Variable Text
If in this manner the exercise ground for the thought and labour of the textual 
critic and editor lies in precincts of overlap between the immateriality of the 
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work and the materiality of its textual instantiations, textual critics and editors 
must have clear and well correlated conceptions of the forces here at play. A 
work is the outcome of its originator’s creativity; and ‘by default’ we term its 
originator its author. An author, in the first instance, is, or was, an historical 
person, even though, in the second instance, a work may have originated 
with a team of authors, or else may be anonymous, since who created it has 
failed to be recorded.
In relation to both works and authors, notions of authorship need to 
be taken into consideration. If and when they are, we discover that there is a 
pragmatically real as well as a conceptually abstract side to ‘authorship’. Author-
ship may be defined as the activity of real-world authors, singly or collectively. 
But in reverse, it may be defined from the perspective of a body of writing 
subsumed under the label of an author name. The Scandinavian languages 
possess the term ‘författarskap’ (Swedish), which translates into English most 
readily as ‘oeuvre’, or ‘works’, or into German as ‘das Werk’ signifying the body 
of works carrying the label because empirically originating with the author 
or authors supplying the labelling name. Although defined grammatically in 
the possessive case of the author name (Shakespeare’s oeuvre, Goethes Werke, 
Strindbergs författarskap), the ‘oeuvre’, ‘die Werke’, the ‘författarskap’ most 
immediately yet comprises the (immaterial) works of these authors in the 
(material) manifestation of their texts.
Such lines of argument lead to conceiving clearly of the ‘author’ as 
not an historical personage merely. On closer reflection, our awareness is 
sharpened that the ‘author’ not only is, but has always been, too, a mental 
projection from the works under his or her name – such as they existed 
in the public realm as texts subsumed under the titles of these works. The 
works’ guarantors were of old Ovid, or Horace, or Seneca, or Cicero, or 
Aristotle – with the name not so much designating the historical personage 
as metonymically extrapolated from the work. For invoking the guarantors – 
the authorities – a paraphrase was as good as a verbatim citation, provided it 
expressed and was considered true to the author’s thought, such as it was by 
cultural consensus understood from his works. In such manner, a medieval 
writer (Geoffrey Chaucer, say) would cite an author from antiquity (Ovid) 
as his ‘authority’. We have as a matter of fact to this day not abandoned 
treating authors’ names in like manner: we read Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, 
Henry James or Virginia Woolf, or indeed ‘our Shakespeare’, ‘our Goethe’, 
which emphasizes that we construct an author image subjectively ours from 
the works read.
Or, more precisely: in the reading of the author, we create the author 
image from the works through their texts. Such texts differ. Texts are, and 
have always been, variant. This is a fact of life, and is a consequence of the 
ineluctable materiality, as well as the ever-pervasive instincts of renewal, 
in the world we live in, as do our books and texts. The variability of texts 
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therefore may be destructive in nature: the result of corruption or material 
decay; or it may be constructive: the outcome of renewed creative input, be 
it through revision, or through participatory, emendational or conjectural, 
editing. One way or another: that texts are always variant is an ontological 
truth. Yet at the same time, it is a truth that has always been largely elided. 
Our cultural urge is for stable and immutable texts. Or, more cautiously put: 
our post-enlightenment urge is for stability and immutability as the sovereign 
qualities of texts. This has to do with a new cultural estimate, as well as a new 
self-estimate, of authors – a point to which I shall return.
It is worth following up, first, the circumstance that the ever-variability 
of texts has been elided, or else accepted, differently in different historical 
periods. From this follows, in turn, a reversal in the definition of ‘authority’. 
If it is accurate to say, as suggested, that medieval writers and audiences 
would cite ‘authority’ by author name, and in faithful reference mainly to 
thought and idea of given works, it seems to be a fact also that, as medi-
evalist scholarship sees it, scribes and scriptoria in the Middle Ages, for all 
their endeavours to transmit ‘good’ texts, lived quite happily, at the same 
time, with, and in, the variability of the works’ texts, and indeed actively 
participated in spawning further their variability. Yet what, unbeknownst, 
these medieval agents of textual transmission also worked towards was 
the emergence of an idea of the textus receptus – historically, a humanist 
achievement (and culturally closely related, as it happens, to the medial 
shift from a manuscript-based to a print-based norm of communication and 
transmission). The establishment of the notion of the textus receptus marks 
a shift, too, from the canonising of works to a canonising of texts; or: of 
works as texts. This is the historical moment, furthermore, that marks the 
beginning of our own pervasive notion, or illusion, that in the shape of the 
text materially in our hands we have possession of the work, which yet this 
text can but represent, but can in truth not be.
It is at this point that the concept of ‘authority’ acquires a new defini-
tion. ‘Authority’ is no longer the author name that guarantees the genuine-
ness of the thought and articulated ideas elicited from a reading memory 
of an author’s works. It is now what is sought so as to authenticate the 
establishing of authors’ texts with literatim accuracy. This is the view that 
textual criticism and editing still entertain today. It is, however, but seem-
ingly self-evident. It subscribes to an understanding of ‘authority’ that is 
historically contingent and became fully codified only in the early nineteenth 
century. For even though the editing of surviving texts of works from clas-
sical antiquity had been carried forward in an unbroken tradition since the 
Age of Humanism, and a fresh tradition, moreover, of editing vernacular 
texts on the model of classical editing had latterly grown, it was only in the 
early nineteenth century that textual criticism and editing came into their 
own as scholarly disciplines.
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3. Historicism and Textual Scholarship
For methods of analysis to impose on the patterns of presumptive relationships, 
a model was provided by enlightenment science. In the eighteenth century, the 
Swedish biologist Carl von Linné developed a binary-structured systematics 
of nature. This proved adaptable to the new text-critical thinking. Surviving 
texts differed between themselves as well as in relation to their lost antecedent 
states simply (it was assumed) in a binary fashion, by error or non-error. Under 
this assumption, they became relatable, moreover, in groupings apparently 
analogous to families, for which, consequently, family trees could be drawn. 
This move was the foundation of the stemmatic method in textual criticism.3 
(Incidentally, it anticipated, in a manner, Charles Darwin’s genetically, hence 
historically, oriented adaptation of Carl von Linné’s historically ‘flat’ taxono-
mies). As method, stemmatics is double-tiered. For the purposes of textual 
criticism, it operates on the historical givens, the documents and their texts. 
Critically analysed, the results from collating all extant document texts are 
schematised in a graph, the stemma. The process of collation thus strives to be 
inclusive. The ensuing operation of critical editing, by contrast, is predicated 
on exclusion. For on the grounds of reasoning that the stemma provides, every 
document text that fails to meet the validity criterion underlying the analysis 
of the collational variation can, for the labour of critically constituting the 
edited text, be left aside. This leaves, ideally, just one document text on which 
to build a critically edited text. Where this base text features what the analysis 
of variants has deemed to be an error, the erroneous reading gets emended by 
what has been critically assessed as a genuine reading from another document 
text; or else by a conjectural reading devised out of the editor’s ingenuity. 
Else, all instances of variation from the body of collated document texts are 
recorded, if at all, in an apparatus (footnoted or appended).
The stemmatic method as a whole was (and, where practiced, still is) 
predicated on the assumption that family trees could be established: the very 
idea of family relationships meant that extant documents and their texts 
descended from an inferentially, if not materially, recoverable ancestry. This 
ancestry not only could, but positively had to be construed, if only just to 
make sense of the collation evidence from the extant documents and their 
texts. The fountainhead of a given text, admittedly, was on all accounts lost. 
To varying degrees, nonetheless, lost documents could be inferred by drawing 
logical conclusions from the variation between the texts of the extant ones. In 
fact, it was only by such inference that the missing links between the extant 
documents and their texts could be filled in, and thus the stemma as a graph 
of interconnections could be achieved at all. The lost documents were pos-
ited in terms of their presumptive texts: that is, they were furnished logically 
with text ‘cloned’ from the extant textual states. Ideally, a text could thus be 
diachronically reconstructed back to its very source, its (presumptive) one text 
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of origin. And if the ideal – imagined, say, as that fountainhead origin, the 
very first manuscript to come from the author’s hand – proved irretrievable, 
a ‘real’ common ancestor of all extant derivative texts could rationally (that 
is, by critical assessment of the collations performed) still be arrived at: the 
archetype.
4. Real Authors and Stable Texts
The rationale of stemmatics came at a price. It made no allowance for the ‘fact 
of life’ that variability is a natural condition of texts. Behind this blind-spot 
lies the cultural assumption of a stable and finalised text. This notion in turn 
is rooted in the cultural role conceded the author. As the editing of texts in 
the vernacular increased through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all 
over Europe, their authors came to be perceived no longer as abstract, even 
though nameable, ‘authorities’, as in earlier times. They were instead known 
to be, or to have been, real, historically situated individuals. Texts transmitted 
were both attributable to, and claimed by them. What is more, these texts 
came in bookprint editions of multiple copies. No longer was every copy of 
a text different from another, as throughout the eras before print. The pub-
lic awareness of texts from real identifiable authors was thus that they were 
identical, and in practical terms invariant (at least throughout given book 
editions). The (printed) text in hand came therefore not only to stand in for, 
and materially to represent, the work (as is common understanding still today). 
It was (as it still is) taken to be the work. The underlying conception of ‘the 
work’, in other words, was, and is, one of a self-identical text manifestation, 
invariant and closed. The cultural notion of the invariant text published by an 
empirical author, furthermore, was seen to coincide with, and to reinforce, the 
earlier logical construct of (in stemmatic terms) an archetype, and a fortiori 
an original text (‘Urtext’), constituting, as a posited material text, the work 
of the auctor absconditus of the distant past.
Authors of the present as of the past came to be seen, and indeed defined, 
as canonical authors. This view, too, emerged from the rise of historicism. Its 
finest flower was the perception of the artist, and for our purposes specifically 
of the author, as an original genius. This mode of appreciation carried a double 
aspect. It conferred upon the author a societal recognition. It reciprocally went 
into shaping an author’s self-image and imbued the author with a sense of his or 
her public identity and role. Johann Wolfgang Goethe was probably Germany’s 
most exalted exponent of the new author type. He became Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe in fact precisely in recognition of his eminent public role. He was 
both seen and saw himself in canonical lines of the cultural tradition. From out 
of his self-image, he so also contributed to shaping his public image for his time 
and for posterity.4 One means by which he did so that concerns us here was 
his editing, or his overseeing of the editing, of his work, that is: of his oeuvre. 
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Behind such editing stood Goethe’s authority. Even allowing that this was to a 
significant degree the authority of the writer, it was yet fundamentally, too, the 
authority of the man, the citizen, the courtier, and the public figure.
Such standing of the historical personage in life raises for us the question: 
what relation does the empirical, real-life authority it confers bear to the concept 
of ‘authority’ in textual criticism and editing? The more immediate the real 
presence of authors has become to readers, as well as to societies, the stronger, 
naturally, has grown, on the one hand, their claim to authority over their work, 
together specifically with authority over the text(s) of that work; and, on the other 
hand, the readiness of society and the body politic to concede their claim. Such 
encompassing authority has in fact been legally codified. Real authors’ copyrights 
and moral rights are protected today virtually throughout the world. Yet this 
laudable acceptance of real-life authors and their personal rights in the societies 
we live in obscures rather than clarifies or resolves the fundamental systemic 
problem of whether or how to relate the empiric and societal conceptions of 
‘authority’ to the scholarly endeavour of securing the written cultural heritage of 
texts. In one respect, it must remain uncontested that authors can do whatever 
they wish with the material record of their authoring enterprises. Specifically, 
they can exercise practical authority over acts of copying and publication. Their 
wishes must carry weight in the endeavours of bringing their work as texts to 
their readers. Anywhere along the way, too, they are of course free to discard 
any amount of traces of their work, for instance throw away (or, in our digital 
age, attempt to erase) notes or drafts, or shred typescripts or marked-up proofs. 
In another light, however, any such pragmatics in real-life situations bear but 
obliquely on assessments of textual authority.
5. The Fallacies of Document and Textual Authority
But what kind of animal, we should pause to reflect, is ‘textual authority’ at 
all? In devising the methodology of stemmatics, and in particular in the en-
deavour of critical analysis of patterns of text relationships revealed through 
collation, the aim, as we have noted, was to establish textual validity against 
errors of transmission. The texts constructed for the inferred documents – the 
archetype or, exceptionally, the fountainhead original – could not meaning-
fully be seen as invested with authority, since they were mere retro-projections 
from their surviving descendants. Even less meaningfully could they so be 
seen, considering that there were not – not even for any possibly to be posited 
originals – any public or legal, or private, let alone any manifest writing acts of 
their authors’ on record from which to infer, or by which to confer ‘authority’. 
Such considerations should lead us to discerning the fallacy underlying the 
very concept of ‘textual authority’.5
To this end, we might profitably attempt to disentangle, at long last also 
for the benefit of textual criticism and scholarly editing, the real-life author 
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from the author function that, in terms of theory, texts both imply and in-
deed generate and constitute. If it can be said that Roland Barthes’s ‘death of 
the author’ (1967) has, as a slogan, generally tended to overshadow Michel 
Foucault’s significant elucidation of the ‘author function’ (1969), it would 
probably also be true that textual critics, and editors in particular, must be 
counted among those who still hold both tenets in scorn. (They will insist: 
‘The author is real: look, these manuscripts are incontrovertible proof that the 
author is not dead – or was not when he wrote them!’). Seen with a colder 
eye, however, the proof of the author that manuscripts provide in truth only 
evidences (alike to footprints in the sand) that an author once (or, as the 
case may be, repeatedly) traced his or her hand and writing implement over 
the manuscript page. The real-life author, consequently, cannot honestly be 
conceded more – though also no less – than an empirical and legal authority 
over the documents carrying the texts of his works. To concede him or her an 
overriding authority over those texts, and on top of that to consider those texts, 
as texts, themselves invested with an innate authority, amounts to performing 
an argumentative leap akin to what psychology terms a displacement. It is 
this that constitutes the fallacy suggested.
This brings us back, in passing, to our initial consideration of the contract 
and the will as legal documents. The validity of contracts and wills by civil and 
legal convention is attested by the material documents as such. Their texts are, 
as it were, by definition free from error,6 and particularly so as, and when, they 
accord with formulaic conventions. Signature and seal, moreover, reinforce 
that the document vouches absolutely for the text it contains. It appears that 
from the formalisms characterising this pragmatic model of negotiating legal 
states of authority evolved the formalisations of authority and authorisation 
in the triangle relationship of text, document and author. Yet the purported 
analogy, for all that it has gone unquestioned for centuries, does not in truth 
hold. Texts in the cultural realms of transmission are by definition not faultless, 
but on the contrary prone to error. The documents that carry them are, in 
their great variety, ‘formless’, and they are private. As such, they exist outside 
societal conventions and laws. The creative subjectivity of authors, and indeed 
their freedom of will in making decisions, finally, cannot affect in their essence 
either documents or the texts they carry. Documents and texts are entities 
outside of authors as real-life individuals. Hence authors, even though they 
are pragmatically their agents, cannot themselves rise to a position of essential 
authority over them, so as to decree an authoritative status for documents and 
texts. At most, they can testify to, and attest their relative validity.
How the elision of the pragmatic and the essential came about can be 
historically retraced, too, in terms of the progression of a methodology for the 
emerging discipline of textual criticism and scholarly editing. Stemmatology 
was, as we have seen, the discipline’s early choice of method for analysing and 
editing transmissions of texts from antiquity and the Middle Ages. These were 
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distinctly transmissions of texts. On top of that, they were transmissions spread 
over unique document exemplars, individually variant among each other. They 
were, by the technical term, radiating transmissions. The rules for regulating the 
correlation of the texts in a radiating stemma, even while text-centred, were at 
the same time influenced, admittedly, by the cultural ascendancy of the author 
in that age of historicism when the stemmatic method developed. For its a priori 
assumption was that of the past author’s presumptively one and only original 
text (or the archetype as its prophet). This however did not deflect, but on the 
contrary strengthened, the text-critical and editorial procedures aimed at the 
validation of transmitted text. The concomitant strategies of radical disregard 
of manuscript texts critically adjudicated as inferior resulted in choosing one 
document text as the foundation for a critical text to represent a work.
Such choice by rational variant analysis, and thus from within the material 
of transmission itself, proved not feasible, however, with modern, and often 
actually contemporary, text situations and transmissions. Yet towards these the 
interest and engagement of textual criticism and editing increasingly turned. 
What they required were procedures to deal with a largely linear descent of texts 
in transmission, often combined, moreover, with processes of composition, and 
empirically controlled, moreover, by real-life authors insistently present. Under 
the authorial eye, the decision on which, and from which document and text to 
build a critical edition, was no longer felt to be the editor’s responsibility alone. 
Though procedurally it remained the editor’s, it was conceptually deferred to the 
author. An alternative methodology to stemmatics was thus devised to support 
an ‘author-centric turn’. Method in textual criticism and editing turned from 
being indigenously based on a critically established validity of text, to being 
exogenously predicated on (authorial) authority.7
As basis for the procedures of scholarly editing, the new principles stipu-
lated the ‘authorised document’. The text it carried was declared to possess 
‘textual authority’. By embedding itself in cultural conventions, moreover, the 
method invested the real-life author with the power, the pragmatic author-
ity, to declare both document authorisation and textual authority. Such, in 
outline, was the new methodological framework considered best suited to 
post-medieval textual and transmissional situations. They also re-situated the 
editor. Stemmatology, as said, had operated without a comparably encapsulat-
ing framework. Its methods, aimed at text validation, were essentially rooted 
in the editor’s critical judgement. The notions of authorisation and textual 
authority, by contrast, constituted and constitute a priori regulatives for the 
establishing of edited texts.
6. Author-Centricity versus the Author Function
Founded mainly on empiric and societal convention, the author-centric 
framework to scholarly editing is arbitrary and, as indicated, exogenous to 
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texts. Its inherent difficulties, which are logical as well as methodological, have 
nonetheless been insistently elided, or (more generally) not even perceived. 
They can be made out, however, on at least two levels. Firstly, the empiric 
and arbitrary conferral of authority amounts to a set of vicarious gestures (on 
the part of real-life authors) and assumptions (on the part of textual critics 
and editors, not to mention the cultural environment at large). Secondly, and 
more essentially, that conferral depends on assumptions that texts represent 
not only finalised acts of will of authors, but are in themselves invariant, 
stable, (pre)determinant, and closed. Yet by present-day positions in theories 
of language and of literature, none of these a priori can in truth be upheld. 
Pivotal to today’s notions instead is the insight that texts are variable and in 
principle always open. They are constant not in stability and closure, conferred 
by a finalising authorial fiat, but constant, if constant, only in being always 
capable of also being otherwise.
This recognition can be made operable, too, in terms of textual scholar-
ship and editing; yet if so, it can be made operable from inside the material 
body of texts only. The key would seem to lie in the notion of the author 
function. As a theoretical tenet, it has amply proved its applicability to, for 
instance, the critical analysis of narrative. It can equally, I suggest, be utilised 
in analytically and critically dealing with texts and their materials of compo-
sition and transmission. If in an ontological sense it is in the nature of texts 
to be variable, and if at the same time texts are the creations of authors, then 
variability is the mark that texts carry of their authors’ creativity, as well as of 
their own potential, as texts, for also always being capable of being otherwise.8 
Systemically, therefore, in terms of the autonomy of texts, their variability 
is an expression of the author function which is inscribed into them, and 
thus contributes to constituting texts as texts. Constituting texts in ways 
predicated on variability – the quality which is of their nature as it is of the 
nature of language, out of which texts are generated – is in terms of creativity 
the primary prerogative of authors. Secondarily, and in critical terms, such 
constituting should be acknowledged, too, as a goal of scholarly editing. From 
the perspective of today we should see it as incumbent on scholarly editions 
of the future not only to record variation of texts through their processes of 
past transmission. This is and will be, as it has hitherto been, the function 
of apparatus presentations of variants. Yet editions to come should equally 
endeavour to do justice to the variability in texts throughout the processes of 
their very creation. For this, as one may already dimly discern, it will not be 
sufficient to devise new formats for scholarly editions. The ways in which to 
embed textual criticism and scholarly editing in literary criticism and theory 
will themselves demand to be thought through with renewed attention. The 
reflections on authority (as conceded to real-life authors), on document 
authorisation, or on textual authority here entertained, with the suggestion 
of abandoning these concepts, may pave the way towards such re-thinking.
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7. The Author’s Intention Rooted in Copy-Text Editing
First, however, a concept that has become central yet needs to be broached, 
and to be recognised as the hindrance it is on paths of potential progression 
in theory as in pragmatics for textual criticism and scholarly editing, literary 
criticism and literary theory together. This is the author’s intention. Invoking 
the author’s intention as final arbiter for establishing scholarly editions is what 
gives the ultimate twist to that author-centred methodology which (as we 
have argued) today appears untenable, since predicated on texts’ invariance, 
stability, (pre)determinacy, and closure. The notions herein of pre-determinacy 
and final intentions, in particular, disastrously reinforce each other. Not only 
do they imply that a text as achieved at the final point in time of its recorded 
development not merely represents, but positively constitutes the work. Over 
and above this mis-perception, they imply, too, a teleological model for creative 
writing still unreflectedly rooted in original-genius aesthetics.
The invocation of the author’s intentions has played a dominant role 
particularly in Anglo-American textual criticism and editing throughout most 
of the second half of the twentieth century. Here, intentionalist editing was 
codified as a result of the generalisation of the methods of copy-text editing 
which originated in Shakespearean textual scholarship.9
For the larger part of the twentieth century, Shakespearean textual scholar-
ship was driven by twin forces of select methodology. One was its submission 
to analytical and textual bibliography. The other, which concerns us here, was 
the transfer of the ways of text-critical treatment of the radial dispersion of 
texts in medieval manuscripts to the early post-Gutenberg transmissions of 
texts linearly from manuscript printers’ copies to first and subsequent edi-
tions in book. The main precepts of method were developed by the eminent 
British textual scholar of the first half of the twentieth century, Walter Wilson 
Greg. Greg’s strengths lay in the application of an all but unrivalled faculty of 
analytic logic to a rich archival observation and experience. They were rooted, 
moreover, in classical and medievalist methodologies of textual criticism. In 
his perception of texts and their transmission, he was at bottom a stemma-
tologist. Consequently, he understood how the extant earliest printings of 
Shakespeare’s texts naturally derive from lost manuscripts. At the same time, 
he recognised how close they were to their state and shape in those anteced-
ent, if lost, scribal, or even autograph, documents. From this understanding, 
he pronounced rules for copy-text editing by which to constitute edited texts 
by re-constituting a textual state and shape critically inferred for the lost 
documents. It was archetype-directed text-critical and editorial thinking that 
thus claimed to be recovering a maximum, with luck even an optimum, of 
original Shakespeare text from the derivative witnesses-in-print to these texts.
Not that this adaptation of a methodology originally devised for pre-
Gutenberg manuscript transmissions did not have its pitfalls. For instance, 
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Greg disastrously misjudged the textual situation for William Shakespeare’s 
King Lear. Here were two first printings – a Quarto single-play edition and 
the play’s rendering in the First Folio volume – that diverged widely. So strong 
was Greg’s stemmatological bent that he apodictically refused to entertain 
the hypothesis that these two textual states reflected two distinct versions of 
the play. He held the variation between the two printings to be due to errors 
of transmission entirely. The alternative proposition is that the dramatist’s 
progressive development of the play in composition and revision may be 
captured from the divergence in variation between the two printed versions. 
This is the hypothesis that in Shakespeare criticism and textual criticism has 
meanwhile been thoroughly tested and validated.10
Where Greg recognised the need for adjustment to the inherited method-
ology, however, was with respect to conditions of transmission due to printing 
technology which were naturally unprecedented in the pre-Gutenberg manu-
script era. Texts published in first editions, or generally: in earlier editions, 
could be observed to have been modified by their authors after publication. 
Technically, the authors had been given the opportunity to mark revisions 
on the earlier editions’ pages that were then worked in, in the printing house, 
into re-settings from those preceding editions. The existence of re-settings of 
earlier printings that yet in this manner contained authorial revisions puzzled 
Ronald Brunlees McKerrow in his Prolegomena of 1939 to a complete edition 
of Shakespeare he was preparing to edit, though he did not live to realise the 
edition. While conceding that derivative editions would not only perpetuate 
errors generated in setting the first editions, but would also be adding to them 
their own errors, McKerrow yet saw no alternative to choosing the texts from 
the derivative editions as his copy-texts. He thus took two generations of error 
into the bargain, since among these the genuine post-first-edition revisions 
would be contained. It was W.W. Greg who, posthumously for McKerrow, 
proposed a solution to the dilemma. By logically conceptualising materially 
evident text – printed text – under two aspects, an aspect of state (the text’s 
‘substantive readings’; Greg 1950, 26) and an aspect of shape (its ‘accidentals’, 
i.e., spellings, punctuation and the like; 26), he devised rules for copy-text 
editing. They were published in 1950-1951 and triggered the so-called ‘copy-
text theory of editing’, dominant in Anglo-American editorial scholarship 
from the 1960s onwards.
The rules stipulated that always the first-edition text, or otherwise ear-
liest text, was to be chosen as copy-text for a scholarly, or critical, edition. 
This would ensure that the edited text came as close as possible to the lost 
manuscript printer’s copy. It would do so anyhow in its substance of read-
ings that remained invariant throughout first and subsequent editions, but 
equally, and most particularly, also in its accidentals, regardless of whether 
these remained constant or varied in subsequent editions. Considering that 
accidentals were in early hand-printing largely left to the discretion of printers’ 
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compositors, it was only in first editions, if at all (so Greg’s argument went), 
that the compositors might have followed copy and thus taken over its ac-
cidentals. In some cases that copy could actually be argued to have been an 
autograph. To this clear-cut ruling with regard to first-edition substantives 
and accidentals, there was, too, an important subsidiary. It stipulated that 
the (first-edition) copy-text was to be followed as well in cases of indifferent 
substantive variants. Such ‘indifferent variants’ naturally turned up among the 
body of substantive variants between first edition and revised edition. Since 
they were variants, they needed to be critically weighed whether or not they 
were revisions. If the assessment was inconclusive (indifferent) because they 
might easily be typesetters’ errors, the revised-edition variant was not to be 
admitted to the edited text.
It was essential in terms of Greg’s rulings, in other words, to isolate from 
the subsequent edition such readings as by their quality could be critically 
assessed as revisions. They, and they alone, were (text-)critically singled out 
from derivative but revised editions and were then editorially used to modify 
the copy-text into the critically edited text. Procedurally, the modification was 
done by way of emending the revisions into the copy-text. Within the texture 
of the (first-edition) copy-text the first-edition-state substantive readings were 
replaced by the corresponding substantive readings from the revised-state edi-
tion that had been critically assessed individually as revised readings.
This was the first time in Anglo-American scholarly editing that not only 
textual variation-in-transmission was scrutinized: that is, variation originat-
ing with agents other than the author (inferred for lost, or evident at extant, 
stages of transmissions). This was variation of an extraneous nature, and hence, 
virtually by definition, variation as ‘error’. Now, by way of critically discern-
ing and isolating revisions in (bibliographically, and thus transmissionally) 
derivative editions, variation in the progression of texts was taken account 
of, too – variation by definition not ‘error’, since integral to the text(s) of the 
work in question in its (their) evolution over time.11 Interestingly though, 
as we have seen, Greg from out of his high analytical powers found a way of 
bending such new departures in the concerns of textual criticism back onto 
the inherited patterns of reaching out behind surviving manifestations of texts. 
The composite, critically eclectic edition text was the mirror image, as it were, 
of the successfully reconstructed archetype text. Gregian copy-text editing was 
thus still firmly modelled on archetype editing, even while paradoxically the 
infusion by emendation of post-copy-text revisions into the copy-text substra-
tum for the edited text was allowed that had no imaginable – or rather, bore 
an imaginary relation only to a given text’s pre-survival state, materially lost.
Greg’s rules provided the foundation for the specifically Anglo-American 
mode of critical eclecticism in scholarly editing. Critical eclecticism to 
construct as edited text a composite of readings early and late in a textual 
development, and before as well as after its first material manifestation in the 
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state and shape of a public text, requires belief in a teleology of texts, coupled 
with confidence that telescoping a textual development over time into the one 
plane of the edited text is legitimate procedure. The adjective ‘critical’ is the 
important face-saver, forestalling the negative view that the procedure con-
taminates. It has of old in scholarly editing been branded as ‘contamination’ 
to implant readings from one historical instantiation, one version, of a text 
into another. For this reason, ‘critical eclecticism’ has been generally viewed 
with acute suspicion outside the Anglo-American sphere.
Greg’s copy-text editing itself was rooted in origin-oriented textual criti-
cism as inherited from stemmatology. Yet from assumptions of a teleology of 
texts, at the same time, it nodded towards author-centred textual criticism and 
editing. The author – William Shakespeare to boot – incontestably played a 
role in Greg’s devising of rules. The lure was simply irresistible of an autograph 
fair copy, if not indeed the dramatist’s so-called foul papers, underlying, at 
shortest transmissional distance, the surface of a play’s first manifestation in 
print. But even with Greg’s acute awareness of the author as factor and agent 
in the textual transmission, his text-critical procedures remained squarely bent 
on validating text. Even emending a first-edition text with the substantive 
revisions critically ascertained from a subsequent edition was understood as 
an editorial measure to validate authorial text for the work. The copy-text 
editing rules were not aimed at fulfilling authorial intentions.
Their acute potential for being precisely so transmuted, however, was 
soon perceived. Fredson Bowers, US textual scholar of the generation after 
Greg – it was Bowers who published Greg’s ‘Rationale of Copy-Text’ in the 
1950-1951 volume of the annual Studies in Bibliography that he had begun to 
edit – not only saw, but capitalised on the intentionalist implications of Greg’s 
rules. The institution of these rules as the foundation for intention-oriented 
copy-text editing was Bowers’s doing. The fusion came to be known as the 
‘Greg-Bowers theory of copy-text editing’ – not a ‘theory’ strictly speaking, 
perhaps, but unquestionably a set of strong principles for scholarly editing. 
Their base was Greg’s copy-text-editing rules generalised timelessly for the 
scholarly editing of texts (or at least of literary texts) of all kinds from all peri-
ods. Pragmatically, the generalisation was pivoted on procedures of analytical 
and textual bibliography. The superstructure devised for the Greg-Bowers 
principles was the tenet that it was the ultimate task and duty of the critically 
eclectic scholarly edition to fulfil the author’s intentions, or the author’s final 
intentions, or the author’s latest intentions – by variant adjectives, the goal, 
as it was progressively argued, came to be variously modified.
What Bowers performed in thus giving an intentionalist turn to textual 
criticism and scholarly editing was something of a coup-d’état. For it was precisely 
at the intellectual moment in the course of the twentieth century when New 
Criticism culminated in literary theory of the Wimsatt-Beardsley persuasion, 
which resoundingly proclaimed the intentional fallacy (1954), that he defined 
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fulfilling the author’s intention the ultimate goal of scholarly editing.12 With 
New Criticism in decline, and the critical invocation of intention banned as a 
fallacy, it was now the textual scholar and editor who bore through the throng 
the ‘well-wrought urn’ of the single, pristine, perfect text in shape of the criti-
cally eclectic text fulfilling the author’s intentions. The ‘Urtext’ and archetype of 
past conception became transubstantiated into the absolute text of ideal finality.
8. Intentionalist Editing: some Problems of Hermeneutics
Clearly, fulfilling the author’s intentions constitutes a fulfilment, too, of the 
author-centric orientation and dependency of textual criticism and scholarly 
editing of the past two centuries that we have been discussing. It goes beyond 
– indeed, it transgresses – the foundation in materialities of transmissions that 
textual criticism and editing traditionally built, and relied, upon. For to realise 
authors’ intentions means to establish text that is precisely not inscribed in 
any material document. More specifically still: since it is alone from material 
documents that written authorial text may be read, the procedure of arriving 
at text of the author’s intention must involve declaring what is written as 
somehow in error. This may be trivial wherever, say, the mistake of a scribe, 
or a typist, or a printing-house compositor can be unambiguously made 
out and corrected – hardly an editorial measure, though, that were weighty 
enough to lay claim to fulfilling an authorial intention. Or the making-out 
of the written as in error involves deeper enquiry. In such cases the scrutiny 
of the text as documented turns genuinely interpretative.
This ought to give rise to concerns about the role and expertise of the 
textual critic and editor. They have but seldom, it is true, been denied critical 
faculties; nor should they themselves ever abdicate them. The question however 
is in what modes they should opt to exercise and invest them. The analysis 
of documents or of collations of texts demands of textual critics and editors 
critical skills. Such skills, moreover, are absolutely called upon to validate texts 
and text readings for the purpose of accepting or rejecting them for the edited 
texts of scholarly editions. Even when under the ascendancy of the author 
an over-all responsibility for editorial decisions and results was increasingly 
delegated to authors, real-life authors to boot, and editors consequently tended 
rather to hide behind the author, their text-specific expertise and skills yet 
remained a (usually) sufficiently secure foundation for professionally executed 
scholarly editions. But when it was further imposed upon editions that they 
should aspire to fulfilling authors’ intentions, not only was the question 
not explored what extension of expertise and skills this would entail. More 
fundamentally still, it appears that the intentionalist re-conception of textual 
criticism and scholarly editing was proposed unawares of the very nature of 
the imposition. Yet, if our critique holds, the Greg-Bowers principles clearly 
empower the editor not just, as by older dispensations of textual editing, to 
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assess and adjudicate, out of a specialised professionalism, the extant material 
record of given transmissions. In addition, the principles invest the editor with 
a hermeneutic dominance over the work. For if under teleological premises 
the author’s final intentions enter integrally into configuring the meaning 
of a text (as expression of a work), then it follows that it is the author’s final 
intentions as supplied editorially that provide the textual capstone to realising 
the work’s ultimate meaning. This conundrum has a theory dimension which 
yet awaits a solution – unless it be a genuine alternative simply to abandon 
the intentionalist stance for editorial scholarship.
9. Reconceptions
Beyond the point at which it culminated in the intentionalism of twentieth-
century Anglo-American textual criticism and editing, the author-centric trend 
in nineteenth and twentieth-century editorial scholarship began to recede. 
Spearheaded by some twenty years (the 1980s and 1990s) of invigorating 
theoretical debate in the Society for Textual Scholarship and its yearbook 
TEXT,13 as well as by single studies such as J.J. McGann’s Critique of Modern 
Textual Criticism (1983), a diversification of concepts for textual and editorial 
scholarship set in that Peter Shillingsburg has meanwhile found categorisable 
into the (formal) ‘orientations’ he specifies14 alongside the ‘authorial orienta-
tion’ that we have singled out for our present reflections.
At virtually the same time in editorial history when the fulfilling of au-
thorial intention was proclaimed the ultimate goal of scholarly editing in the 
Anglo-American domain, authorial intention was within the German editorial 
school declared outright unfit to provide a base for editors’ decisions towards 
establishing edition texts. The key pronouncement in the matter came from 
Hans Zeller, the Swiss-German Nestor (today) of German textual scholarship: 
‘A principle such as authorial intention cannot serve as a central criterion for 
the constitution of text [because it] remains a mere idea of the author on 
the part of the editor, and as such cannot be established reliably’. Though so 
published in English only in 1995, the verdict in the German original is of 
1971 (1995, 24-25). At the same time, however, the landmark collection of 
German essays on textual criticism Texte und Varianten (Zeller and Martens, 
eds, 1971) adheres to, and embraces, what is present-day consensus still, 
namely the author-centric conceptions, attitudes and practices of inherited 
textual scholarship. The German variety of the discipline, it is true, has its own 
favourite problem areas, among which figure prominently the notion of the 
version (‘Fassung’) and the textual fault (‘Textfehler’). Yet the fundamental 
critique of author-centricity proposed here should apply as much to German 
textual scholarship as it does to its Anglo-American near-relation.
To return to Zeller’s pronouncement on intention: his salient specification 
is that ‘authorial intention cannot serve as a central criterion for the constitu-
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tion of text’ (1995, 24-25). It does thus not rule out critical investigations 
of authorial intentions, be they manifestly expressed or inferable, nor does it 
disallow consideration, or even observance, of authorial intentions in establish-
ing edited texts. Yet what it categorically denies is the usefulness of authorial 
intention as ultimate arbiter and guide to editorial decision in the critical 
constitution of edited texts. To differentiate so precisely is a stance from which 
to arrive at positive criteria for establishing edited texts. A scholarly edition, if 
and when referring to authorial intention, could under exceptional (meaning: 
particularly clear-cut) circumstances, introduce authorially intended readings, 
as critically recognised, into the edited text itself, but would do this in the 
manner of conjectural emendation, strictly on the editor’s responsibility. Yet 
commonly, an edition would present its editor’s critical assessment of authorial 
intention discursively in an editorial introduction and/or textual note. This 
would be the textual critic’s and editor’s ground from which to share in the 
hermeneutical exploration of a work through its texts. Conversely, the estab-
lishment as such of the edited text for a work would remain firmly grounded 
in the document-supported material evidence for the composition, revision, 
and transmission of the work’s text, or texts.
Renewed beginnings beyond author-centricity are possible and indeed 
conceivable for textual scholarship and critical editing. Summing up from what 
we have here considered and reflected upon, I would propose, simply, that texts 
themselves in their material manifestations in documents be again moved into 
the focus of textual criticism and scholarly editing. Here, the lode-star would 
no longer be ‘authority’ under the exogenous construction of authorisation and 
textual authority, super-structured moreover by deference to an authorial inten-
tion, in duty to be fulfilled by editors and editions. Textual criticism and scholarly 
editing will be well served to be again focused on textual validity, as erstwhile 
under the stemmatic dispensation. Ascertaining and establishing textual validity 
should thus constitute the core of a renewed methodology. Measures of textual 
validity would be gained from the author function. Pertaining ontologically to 
language composed as text, the author function is inscribed universally at any 
stage or moment of text composition or transmission.
This holds true even where real-life authors impinge most closely on 
textual traces, which is when we encounter them even physically (or at 
least in the mediate author-physicality of their handwriting or doodling) in 
documents of composition. Yet so distinctly, at the same time, is the author 
function as a compositional function present in drafts, that to edit writing 
from documents of composition means to edit from their material record not 
solely validated text as resulting from the acts of writing, but additionally a 
distinct authorship dimension emerging from the processes of that writing.
What this might mean should be as good a point of entry as any for 
sustained explorations of the hermeneutic dimension specific to textual criti-
cism and scholarly editing. It is a question hitherto little considered. This 
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is paradoxical, seeing to what extent ‘meaning’ has demanded attention in 
recent theorizings of textual and editorial scholarship. Significantly, though, 
the need to reflect on ‘meaning’ has followed in the wake of explicating the 
notion of authorial intention,15 and debates have correspondingly been enacted 
at a middle, or even a total, distance from texts as materially evidenced. The 
considerations are, and have been, stimulating; and in principle they concede 
to editorial scholarship an interpretative, and thus ultimately hermeneutic, 
dimension. What remains to be assessed, however, is the place and quality of 
interpretative criticism – the hermeneutic stance, in other words – as indis-
solubly tied back to the manifest materiality of texts and their transmissions.
As for texts as the materialisations of the authoring of works, what 
we believe to have sufficiently indicated is that the author dimension and 
perspective cannot, and must not be abandoned or sacrificed under renewed 
methodological tenets for the combined disciplines of textual criticism and 
editing. Yet here, in terms of text, ‘the author’ would cease to be an exog-
enous legislator and arbitrator, and instead be perceived from the inside, as 
it were, and thus as a systemically integrated text function within the body 
of the text-critical and editorial endeavour itself. In terms of textual trans-
mission, the author would be definable as a function of the extant material 
documents. Simultaneously, though, it should go without saying that the 
existence of real-life authors would not be negated, nor would expressions 
of will of empirical authors, or closely critical considerations of authorial 
intention, by dint of method be anathemized. Text-critical investigations 
would continue to be directed towards them, and these would continue to 
be accounted for in introduction and commentary discourses of editions. In 
view, furthermore, of the future importance of editing distinct authorship 
dimensions for texts, considerations of authorial intention (which would 
similarly have their place in an edition’s discourses collateral to the edited 
text) should be matched by assessments of authorial responses to self-per-
formed acts of writing (texts, once in process of composition, will insist on 
‘talking back’ to their authors – as anybody knows from everyday experience; 
and this basically dialogic situation of writing often enough leaves material 
traces in draft documents – which intrinsically is of both compositional 
and critical interest). A renewed methodology for textual criticism and 
scholarly editing, lastly, would as ever be geared towards closest scrutiny of 
transmissions for exogenous error. In validating text against error it would 
still draw all that can be gained from subsidiary methods such as analytical 
and textual bibliography, palaeography, paper analysis, or digital imaging in 
all its highly advanced forms. The digital medium, finally, should itself, as 
no doubt it will, become the future home and environment for the scholarly 
edition. This is a subject I have discussed elsewhere (see Gabler 2010a). The 
present article may be considered as contributing to reflecting on principles 
towards a praxis of editions ultimately to live as digital scholarly editions.
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1 What follows thus seeks to carry forward, and complement with propositions for the 
document-authoriality relationship, the argument begun with exploring the relationship 
between document and text in Gabler (2007).
2 Hubert Best, international copyright lawyer, illuminatingly informs me (by private 
email) that ‘under Common Law … the written contract is in fact only the evidence of the 
actual contract, which became a legally binding agreement when the parties entered into it. 
… [W]ills and deeds … require documentation and formalities (e.g. witnesses, in the case of 
a will)’. This reinforces my insistence on the logical distinction between document and text. 
At the same time, it exemplifies a cultural transition from the oral to the written. The legally 
binding agreement constituting a contract was by a performative speech act and handshake 
entered into by two living partners. A will such as we know it, by contrast, since it becomes 
meaningful only on the death of the person expressing the will, could not exist without the 
document ‘will’. Importantly, nonetheless, it is essentially not the material document, but the 
text contained in the document that the person witnessing testifies to.
3 Interestingly, the first known graph of a family-tree for documents and their texts is 
documented from Sweden (not fortuitously, perhaps, considering the Linné connection). It 
was drawn up by K.J. Schlyter, the country’s most penetratingly modern textual scholar of his 
time, who visualised for his 1827 edition of a legal codex, Westgötalagen, the relationship of the 
texts from ten extant and four inferred documents in a stemma he names ‘Schema Cognationis 
Codicum manusc’ (Holm 1972). The Swedish precedence in the development of stemmatology 
that soon was to gather momentum for nineteenth and twentieth century classical and medieval 
textual scholarship appears hitherto to have gone unnoticed in Germany and elsewhere, where 
Karl Lachmann is in the main credited with its invention. I owe knowledge and understanding 
of Swedish and Scandinavian scholarly editing traditions greatly to exchanges with Dr Paula 
Henrikson of Uppsala University, as well as to her conference contributions and other writings.
4 Klaus Hurlebusch (1988) suggestively discusses the interaction between individual 
author and society in the forming of ‘author images’.
5 Shillingsburg (1996), by contrast, is, from its opening sentence in ‘Part 1. Theory’ 
onwards, wholly predicated on ‘concepts of textual authority’.
6 Hubert Best (see footnote 2) adds the legal specification: ‘where the common law 
contract is merely evidence of the actual contract, if the document plainly does not conform 
with the actual agreement, it is set aside (doctrine of “mistake”)’.
7 Shillingsburg (1996) proposes, in ‘Chapter Two: Forms’, a set of ‘orientations’ for 
scholarly editing, among which is the ‘authorial orientation’. My present argument is an at-
tempt to give a historical depth perspective to Shillingsburg’s formal, and thus ‘flat’ taxonomy.
8 Such understanding provides the foundation for Roger Lüdeke’s theory of revision, 
developed in Lüdeke (2002).
9 Again, P.L. Shillingsburg (1996) may be cited here for its convenient overview, in the 
chapter ‘Intention’, 29-39 in the book’s ‘Part I. Theory’, of the concept of authorial intention 
and its application to Anglo-American schfolarly editing in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Of greater complexity is Greetham (1999), chapter 4: ‘Intention in the Text’, 157-205.
10 The late 1970s and the 1980s saw the liveliest debates of the fresh, and distinctly criti-
cally motivated views of the Lear question. Most diversified in its approaches is the book of 
essays, The Division of the Kingdoms, edited by G. Taylor and M. Warren.
11 By contrast, landmark editions of German authors had already towards the end of the 
nineteenth century given scope to the textual evolution of works under their authors’ hands; 
e.g. Friedrich Schiller, Sämmtliche Werke, edited by K. Goedeke.
12 The range of Fredson Bowers’s contributions to the forming of principles and 
practice of editorial scholarship in the second half of the twentieth century may be gauged 
from his 1975 collection. Of particular relevance to our discussion here are the essays 
‘Multiple Authority: New Concepts of Copy-Text’, 447-487 (reprinted from The Library, 
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5th series, 27 [1972], 81-115) and ‘Remarks on Eclectic Texts’, 488-528 (reprinted from 
Proof 4 [1974], 13-58).
13 TEXT: An Interdisciplinary Annual of Textual Studies. Published from 1984 (for 1981) 
to 2006, 16 volumes in all.
14 The ‘documentary, aesthetic, authorial, sociological, and bibliographic’ orientations. 
Shillingsburg (1996), 16 ff.
15 Representative samplings are to be found in Shillingsburg (1996), Greetham (1999) and 
Eggert (2009). Dario Compagno, ‘Theories of Authorship and Intention in the Twentieth Century. 
An Overview’ in the present volume, furthermore, helps to recognise how these investigations 
chime in with the main-stream arguments in hermeneutics and literary theory. Compagno’s essay 
is a welcome partner to the present contribution. It helps admirably to sharpen the contours of 
my argument conducted specifically from the point of view of textual and editorial scholarship.
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